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Abstract: Following the U.K. Labour government commitment to marriage in the 
1998 Green Paper ‘Supporting Families’, Barlow and Duncan produced a 
robust critique calling for ‘realism’ in recognising that many couples are 
now choosing not to marry, that too many do not make informed decisions 
as to whether to marry or not and that, on the basis of their survey, over 
40% of respondents believed that some form of family law protection would 
be available to them, despite their lack of marital status. When this is added 
to a concern that economically vulnerable cohabiting women do not receive 
adequate protection in property law, it seems all too obvious that the 
government commitment to marriage should be challenged. In fact, 
government policy does seem to have shifted somewhat when, partly as a 
tactical manoeuvre to help the passage of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 
and specifically recognising concerns with the needs of economically 
vulnerable parties, the issue was referred to the Law Commission for 
England and Wales. This places the ‘realism’ arguments firmly within the 
reform agenda. However, this article argues that there is a need to look 
more closely at the arguments used by the ‘realists’, in particular at the 
evocation of the figure of Mrs. Burns. The more contemporary case of 
Oxley v. Hiscock is used to both raise questions about the socio-economic 
profiles of cohabitants, as well to question the presentation of property law 
as failing women (and family law as offering the protection they need). I 
argue that feminists should take a cautious approach in relation to the 
seemingly compelling argument that cohabitants will benefit from the 
extension of aspects of marriage law to cover property issues at the end of a 
relationship. 
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Why do we need law reform for cohabitants?
1
 For most commentators the answer is all too 
obvious: unmarried women are too often disadvantaged when dealing with property (by 
which is usually meant the home in which they have been living) at the end of a cohabiting 
relationship. The general argument swings on two related points: the first that property law 
favours the economically dominant partner and the second that, as women are still 
economically disadvantaged, they are more likely than their partners to suffer economic 
vulnerability at the end of a relationship. The solution, again, seems all too obvious: extend 
the protection and benefits of family (marriage) law to the unmarried. In particular, family 
(divorce) law allows the court to redistribute property between the parties, taking into 
account factors which are not (overtly at least) recognised in property law, notably the age 
of the parties and length of the relationship, the circumstances which brought the 
relationship to an end, contributions made to the welfare of the family (caring) and future 
needs.
2
 In the light of the recent trend in reported decisions to award, in appropriate cases, 
                                                 
1
 Despite the fact that the English and Welsh Law Commission covers same-sex relationships within its remit 
(not to do so would open the government to an all too obvious challenge under the Human Rights Act 1998), 
my paper specifically addresses the issue of cohabiting women in heterosexual relationships. The ‘push for 
reform’ for cohabitants has come from a concern to protect such women and it is this issue that I am 
interested in for the purposes of this paper. That any proposals for reform will also be extended to same-sex 
partners under principles of equality, constructs an interesting trajectory in which reform will, on the 
argument of this paper, be addressed to women in terms of economic disadvantage arising from (or 
exacerbated by) heterosexual partnerships, but will then be automatically extended to cover very different 
scenarios. (See further Bottomley & Wong (2006)). 
2
 Under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (as amended). Similar provisions are now available to registered 
same-sex partners under the Civil Partnership Act 2004. 
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what seems to be a rather more generous amount to an ex-wife,
3
 it seems to many 
increasingly unjust not to allow unmarried cohabitants access to the same process of 
decision-making, especially given the number of couples who are now cohabiting rather 
than marrying. 
 This article is intended as something of a counterweight to this push for reform. 
Written primarily as a call for a more careful evaluation of the arguments ‘for realism’, it 
also raises questions about why the government, having made clear their initial preference 
to support marriage (on the basis that the statistics suggest that marriage is a more stable 
social unit than cohabitation), now seem to be moving towards a position that could support 
the extension of certain benefits of marriage (or rather divorce) to the unmarried, especially 
the benefit of property adjustment orders. It is part of my argument that we should consider 
why the government is now willing, it seems, to reconsider its initial position in favour of 
marriage. For some sections of the establishment any pattern of reform of this nature will 
be controversial in (it is argued) further undermining the legal exclusiveness of marriage.
4
  
Within this context, the political agenda may well become set in terms which suggest that 
the most (indeed, possibly ‘only’) progressive move a feminist can make is to support the 
extension of family law to cover the property disputes of cohabitants. My intention is to try 
and open a third ‘front’, which considers rather more carefully the implications of the 
                                                 
3
 Particularly since White v. White [2001] A.C. 596. What is most significant is the language and conceptual 
frames deployed in these cases (‘equality’, ‘compensation’, ‘entitlement’ and ‘expectation’) rather than the 
actual awards. 
4
 What will become interesting as pressure for reform builds and the ‘protection of marriage’ defenders have 
to articulate their views more carefully, is the extent to which they will focus on heterosexuality as the 
context for the ‘marriage’ debate, thereby confirming a position that same-sex registered partnerships involve 
a status which might be analogous to marriage but is not, and was never intended to be, ‘marriage’ per se 
(Bottomley & Wong 2006). 
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arguments for reform, and the likely impact of reform for cohabiting women. This is not to 
argue against reform per se, but rather to argue for some caution. 
 The building of the case for reform rests on the intersection of three primary 
trajectories. The first is based on analysis of data charting the rise in heterosexual 
cohabitation and the related fall in marriage in the U.K. This is linked to social policy 
concerns with both the lack of stability of the cohabitation unit (in contrast to marriage) and 
the economic vulnerability of cohabiting women (and their children). The second 
argument, increasingly deployed, is the evidence gained from two surveys that a large 
proportion of those who cohabit rather than marry think that, when and if necessary, the 
protection of family law will be available to them despite their lack of marital status. These 
two arguments are often brought together in an appeal for ‘realism’ in law reform: in both 
recognising the reality of changing family patterns as well as meeting people’s expectations 
as to how they will be dealt with in law. This then links to the third argument that property 
law (specifically the law of trusts and estoppel) neither meets the needs, nor the 
expectations, of an economically vulnerable partner. When these three trajectories intersect, 
they form a grid around which the argument for reform is built. Emerging from this grid, 
sustaining and sustained by the careful deployment of all three arguments in relation to 
each other, is the iconic figure of a woman who is constantly referred to as embodying the 
need for reform: Mrs. Burns.
5
 After 19 years of living with a man whose name she took, 
and with whom she had two children, in a house registered in his name alone and towards 
which she did not make any financial contribution, the Court of Appeal, in 1984, decided 
                                                 
5
 Burns v. Burns [1984] Ch. 317. The term ‘figure’ is used in this context to suggest that the term ‘Mrs Burns’ 
has been deployed to (re)present ‘a type’ which, by continuing to link it through the process of naming to a 
‘real’ woman (as well as the circumstances and decision of the case), carries a particularly evocative 
rhetorical power, a reminder of the consequences of ‘reality’. 
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that she had no claim towards any equity in the house. It was seen, by many, as a particular 
injustice to her as she had not been able to take up paid employment due to her domestic 
responsibilities and, in the few times when she had had some income, she had used the 
money for the children or family expenses. Mrs. Burns would clearly have benefited from 
access to the divorce courts.      
 In this paper I counter-pose the figure of Mrs. Burns with a figure from a more 
recent Court of Appeal judgment dealing with a property dispute between (ex)cohabitants: 
Mrs. Oxley from Oxley v. Hiscock [2004] 3 All E.R. 703.  I will use the figure of Mrs. 
Oxley in two ways: firstly, to raise questions about how ‘realistic’ it is to continue to argue 
the case for reform through the deployment of the figure of Mrs. Burns as, by implication 
at least, typical of contemporary patterns of cohabitation and the issues arising from these 
patterns.
6
 Secondly, I will argue that the case represents the culmination of considerable 
developments in property law since 1984, which require a re-evaluation of the argument 
that property law necessarily fails the economically disadvantaged partner.  
 
 
THE CASE FOR REFORM: REALISM 
 
The Rise in Cohabitation 
 
                                                 
6
 In other words, I shall argue that it is not only that Mrs. Burns represents the ‘type of woman’, or 
circumstances, from which the strongest case for reform arises, but that her (over-)deployment implies that 
she is, and remains, typical of cohabiting women. 
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In 1979 11% of women aged 18-49 were cohabiting, in 2001 it was 32%.
7
 In 2002, 25% of 
unmarried adults of 16-59 were cohabiting.
8
 The latest Population Trends report (2005) 
suggests that, on current patterns, within 25 years more couples will be cohabiting than 




 These figures are a cause for concern for those who continue to find and exploit 
evidence that cohabitation is less stable than marriage.
10
 This leads many on the Right to 
argue against any reform which might seem to support or encourage cohabitation and 
thereby weaken marriage as a positive choice to be encouraged: 
 
The Solicitors Family Law Association and some other groups have called for extending the same marriage 
rights to cohabiting couples upon their break up. However, this action would deprive people of their right to 
live together on their own terms. Furthermore, it would blur the already fuzzy distinction between 
cohabitation and marriage. Undermining the special status of marriage would weaken an option for people 




                                                 
7
 Office for National Statistics (2004a). All these statistics relate to opposite-sex cohabitation. 
8
 Office for National Statistics (2004b). See also Haskey (2001).  
9
 Population Trends (2005). 
10
 The Centre for Policy Studies has recently (2006) published yet another research report (by Jill Kirby) 
concerned with the need to promote marriage as a more stable unit for the care of children: this report has 
been particularly well covered in the press as it recommends tax incentives to encourage marriage, especially 
for middle-income groups (see e.g. Craig (2006)). 
11
 Civitas, The Facts behind Cohabitation, found on www.civitas.org.uk/hwu/cohabitation.php. 
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Although the primary argument is a need to support the specific choice of the status of 




 A similar approach initially informed Labour government policy. The 1998 Green 
Paper (Home Office 1998) made clear the government’s preference for marriage,
13
 which 
was still evident in the decision in 2004 to set up and finance, via the Department of 
Constitutional Affairs, an information website (first called “One Plus One: Married or 
Not”, now renamed “One Plus One Marriage and Partnership Research”). The site includes 
material that, while recognising a case for reform, includes references that clearly indicate 
that marriage is a better option, not only with regard to the present legal differences but 
also as providing a more stable family unit.
14
 The problem now for the government is 
simple: if they respond positively to the arguments for reform and legislate for cohabitants, 
will this necessarily undermine their promotion of marriage as a preferred choice? It could 
be argued that the government has been brought to this point as a consequence of the need 
(in order to avoid a human rights challenge) to legislate for the registration of same-sex 
                                                 
12
  See also Dnes (2004) who, in using a highly rationalist model of law and economics (in which it is 
necessary to presume that people will make choices based on a cost/benefit analysis) has to keep open the 
principle of choice and therefore supports (in his terms) a ‘libertarian’ position. Within the same 
law/economics framework, such authors are then led into asking questions about how law and social policy 
may play a part in influencing the ‘right’ choices (that is those which will support stable units) and, for some, 
this means keeping (or introducing) exclusive privileges for marriage and marriage-like status relationships 
(e.g. civil partnership), see e.g. Dnes & Rowthorn (2000, 2002). This slips easily (although not necessarily) 
into a neo-conservative agenda supporting marriage. 
13
  See Chapter 4 in particular. 
14
 Who cohabits, when and why? found on One Plus One Marriage and Partnership Research website at  
www.oneplusone.org.uk.  See also the traces in the Department for Constitutional Affairs Research Papers, 
e.g. Lewis (1999).   
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partnerships. During the passage of the Civil Partnership Act 2004, the government agreed 
to refer the issue of cohabitation to the Law Commission, partly to help overcome the 
obstacle of concerns that the interests of same-sex partners were being addressed but not 
the interests of heterosexual, economically vulnerable, cohabiting women (Jacqui Smith, 
H.C. Hansard, 12 Oct. 2004, col. 179).
15
 Thus they were brought to a point where it was 
(is) necessary to reconsider their adherence to the support of ‘marriage’ as the focus of 
family policy.  
 The response from those promoting reform based on ‘realism’ is robust: the 
problem is that not to make some legislative move will leave women and children 
economically vulnerable and that there is now evidence that not only do people not make 
carefully informed rational choices about whether to marry or not, but also that many who 
cohabit think that they will be treated as married if there is a dispute over property. 
 
The Argument for Realism 
 
Barlow and Duncan (2000a, 2000b) introduced this argument in a strong critique of New 
Labour policies concerned to promote the stability of families through marriage; their 
research, and approach, has now led to a substantial body of literature (Barlow et al. 2005; 
                                                 
15
 I am making the presumption that the reference to the Law Commission was not a ‘burial’ tactic. Given the 
subsequent timetable adopted by the Law Commission, I think we can deduce that this is a serious 
programme for consideration of reform. The support of the Law Society for reform as well as, very probably, 
some acceptance of the ‘realism’ argument (although I shall argue later in this paper that the probable 
government ‘reading’ of the argument is not one which the authors were likely to have intended) suggests, to 
me, a very real shift in government thinking from a rather crude support of ‘marriage’ to a more nuanced 
support of ‘stability’: more of this below. 
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Barlow & James 2004; and see Barlow in this volume). Further, and adding a major 
impetus to their argument, they found in interviews with cohabitants that 56% of those 
questioned believed that they would receive some protection from family law in the event 
of property disputes.
16
 The impact of this evidence led to the commissioning of a further 
survey (in part government sponsored) which found that 61% of ‘most people’ believe that 
cohabitants can achieve ‘common law marriage’ status and thus access the benefits of the 
divorce courts.
17
 The cumulative effects of this evidence, referred to also in material 
produced for the Law Society and Resolution
18
 lobbying for reform, has certainly had an 
impact. 
 The ‘realism’ argument also draws strength from being closely tied to a critique of 
property law: in which the figure of Mrs. Burns is brought into play to emphasise how 
much cohabiting women risk. As a 2002 Law Society report arguing for reform begins: “It 




The Inadequacy of Property Law 
 
                                                 
16
 Supported by the Nuffield Foundation. 
17
 Living Together Survey (2004) commissioned by Advicenow, which is supported by the Department for 
Constitutional Affairs and Nuffield Foundation, found on www.Advicenow.org.uk.  Anne Barlow is now 
(2006) undertaking further research, funded by Nuffield, to explore the extent to which the ‘common law 
marriage myth’ is still pertinent. It is intended that this research be ready for submission to the Law 
Commission during the consultation period. She is also undertaking research funded by the Department to 
investigate their campaign to encourage informed choice through the “Living Together” work. 
18
 Previously “The Family Law Solicitors Association”. 
19
 My thanks to Hilary Lim for reminding me of this reference. 
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A paper on the government sponsored website “One Plus One” is representative of the use 




As the case of Burns v. Burns (1984) demonstrated 20 years ago, sharing a house, a name and having children 




The major problem with the evocation of this case in 2006, is that it is no longer 
representative of the law (as will be discussed below). Why then does it continue to be 
invoked by campaigners and even appear on a government-sponsored website? I suggest 
that there are two major reasons for this. Firstly, it stands as a strong warning to women of 
the dangers of cohabitation without marriage. Secondly, for the campaigners, it not only 
displays the inadequacies of the law but also invokes the image of the women they are 
concerned to protect – a woman with children who becomes financially vulnerable because 
of her role as partner/mother. This is the paradigm figure: the woman in need of legal 
protection (or perhaps, rather, legal intervention) in the form of extending (aspects of) 
marriage law beyond the married.    
Bringing together the iconic image of Mrs. Burns with the simple argument that the 
law should be brought into line with what most people already believe is the law, has made 
the reform position very strong. Added to this the sense that the English have fallen behind 
in contrast to so many other jurisdictions (Barlow & James 2004), and in a jurisdiction 
                                                 
20
 Who cohabits, when and why?, supra, n. 14. 
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which has been willing to legislate for same-sex couples but not yet for cohabiting women, 
what is presented is a case not only for ‘justice’ but also for ‘equality’.
21
 
 From within this frame, and with a focus on such women as Mrs. Burns, what does 
the case of Mrs. Oxley suggest?  
 
 




In 1987, Mrs. Oxley, a divorced woman with children, was encouraged by her partner, Mr. 
Hiscock, to exercise her ‘right to buy’ the property she was living in as a social tenant.
23
 It 
was valued for sale at £45,200, from which Mrs. Oxley, based on the number of years she 
had been a social tenant, received a discount of £20,000. Mr. Hiscock provided the further 
£25,200 required, which he raised by selling a property he owned. He was generally 
working abroad, but he lived with her in the house when he was in England.  
 Given the terms of the ‘right to buy’ provisions, the house was registered in her 
name alone. It is clear from the solicitor’s letters, that a number of options had been 
presented to them by the lawyers in order ‘to protect the interest’ of Mr. Hiscock. The one 
which was recommended as the simplest was that a charge be taken out on the property to 
protect what was described as a ‘loan’ made by Mr. Hiscock to Mrs. Oxley.  It was 
informally agreed that the parties would convey the property into joint names when, in 
                                                 
21
 This is not to argue, of course, that Barlow and James veer towards the ‘equality’ argument. It is deployed 
by those who (as in arguments during the passage of the 2004 Act) find the fact that this jurisdiction has 
legislated for same-sex partners before (as in most other jurisdictions) dealing with the vulnerability of 
heterosexual women as evidence of ‘wrong priorities’.  
22
 This summary of the facts is drawn from the judgment in the Court of Appeal. 
23
 Under Part V of the Housing Act 1985. 
Kent Academic Repository – Kent Law School 
Published version available in Feminist Legal Studies 14(2) 181-211 
- 12 - 
 
 
1990, the three year limitation period was over.
24
 In fact, rather than transfer the property 
into joint names, in 1991 it was sold for £61,500. 
 Mr. Hiscock having returned permanently to England, the next purchase was a 
property, costing £127,000, in which they set up home together. It was purchased with the 
monies raised from the sale of the first house, plus £35,000 from Mr. Hiscock with the 
balance of £30,000 being raised as a mortgage loan. This time the property was purchased 
in his name alone. 
 It is (again) clear from the solicitor’s correspondence that the lawyer was not happy 
that the property be put into Mr. Hiscock’s name with no legal protection for Mrs. Oxley’s 
investment. Again a number of solutions were suggested and the lawyer pressed Mrs. 
Oxley for a decision. She finally responded, writing: 
 
Your comments on any claim I might have … have been noted, and I appreciate your concern. However, I am 
quite satisfied with the present arrangements, and feel I know Mr. Hiscock well enough not to need written 
protection in this matter (p. 707).  
 
Although they did not open a joint bank account, they pooled resources to meet the 
outgoings, probably including the mortgage repayments, although the details are not clear 
and we have no evidence on income, etc. They both worked on home improvements and 
decoration (from the evidence given, their roles in relation to this work sound classically 
gendered). In 1999 Mr. Hiscock took early retirement and the mortgage debt was repaid. 
                                                 
24
 Property bought under this scheme cannot be sold within three years without repayment of an element of 
the subsidy: Housing Act 1985, s.155, as amended by Housing and Planning Act 1986, s.2(3). 
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 In 2001 the relationship ended and the house was sold for £232,000. One property 
was then bought for Mrs. Oxley, costing £73,000 of which £33,000 was provided from the 
sale of the house and a £40,000 mortgage loan, in her name, made up the balance. 
 Mr. Hiscock also gave her £5,000, claimed to have already given her c. £3,200 for 
renovation work on the new house and admitted to still owing her c. £1,000. In other 
words, in making these calculations, he treated her financial contribution to the property as 
a loan. He retained the balance from the sale and bought a property for himself for 
£122,000. 
 We have no evidence from the court of how discussions surrounding these 
arrangements proceeded, but we can surmise that Mrs. Oxley felt that she was entitled to 
more as, in late 2002, she began legal proceedings arguing that the beneficial interest in the 
house had been held equally and that she was entitled to a further £72,000.  
 In 2003 she was awarded that amount by the trial judge (a woman), who believed 
her evidence rather than that of Mr. Hiscock. When asked, during court proceedings, why 
the property had been purchased in Mr. Hiscock’s name alone, there was some dispute 
between the parties as to whether they had intended to be joint purchasers but Mrs. Oxley 
contended that they had intended joint ownership and that she had been persuaded by Mr. 
Hiscock that, if the property had been purchased in joint names, her ex-husband might have 
a claim to a portion of it if she died. She also gave evidence that they had planned to marry, 
but that Mr. Hiscock had decided against marriage on the grounds that he had found that it 
would be fiscally disadvantageous. 
 Mr. Hiscock appealed against the judgment of the court of first instance on a point 
of law: whether the trial judge had been right in her use of authority to allow for a range of 
discretion via imputing intention to the parties under a constructive trusts formula,
25
 or 
                                                 
25
 Midland Bank plc v. Cooke [1995] 4 All E.R. 562. 
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whether she should have treated the arrangement under a stricter formula based on a 
resulting trusts model.
26
 I shall return to this appeal and the legal arguments raised later. I 
want to use Oxley firstly, to consider the social and emotional narratives evidenced in this 
case and to argue that they raise some interesting issues for us in discussing the reform of 
property redistribution at the end of a relationship. 
 
 
MRS. OXLEY: MRS. BURNS 
 
I chose to focus on Oxley not only because of its legal importance, but because it offers a 
very different scenario from the case used as the paradigm exemplifier of the need for 
reform. Mrs. Burns had been in a long-term relationship, with children. Not only was she 
economically disadvantaged by her role as mother, but she had also clearly seen herself as, 
and acted as, an economically dependent ‘wife’ who expected to be supported by her 
partner. Mrs. Oxley presents a rather different figure of cohabitant. Although her 
relationship was also a lengthy one (14 years), she was a woman of 34 at the beginning of 
the relationship, had already been married and already had (three) children. There are three 
significant aspects in this profile: her previous marriage, the fact that she brought a 
property interest into the partnership and that her children were of her marriage, not of her 
relationship with Hiscock. All these aspects merit some consideration: they do not ‘fit’ the 
Burns profile but they do exemplify important trends in contemporary cohabitation 
patterns. In other words, they can be used to suggest a rather more complex ‘take’ on 
realism than a picture which continues to be read through the lens (the figure) of Mrs. 
Burns. 
                                                 
26
 Spingette v. Defoe [1992] 2 F.L.R. 388.  
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Not only is there a dramatic increase in the numbers of cohabitants but also, in projections 
forward, this trend will have a significant impact in terms of age. The proportion of women 
over 45 living with a partner is expected to reach 36% by 2031. However, these projections 
are based primarily on the present cohabiting population ageing and the Office for National 
Statistics reports that it does not have evidence to presume that it will be increased by 
women entering into cohabitation following, for instance, the breakdown of a marriage 
(Population Trends 2005, pp. 77-83). Despite this, I want to suggest that more research 
needs to be undertaken on the pattern of divorced or separated women cohabiting in later 
relationships: anecdotal evidence and some case material suggests that this is a significant 
trend, albeit that it might be one which is being ‘played out’ in a generation of women who 
in their youth chose marriage, unlike their daughters.  
 The figure of the cohabitant entering into cohabitation later in life raises some 
interesting questions. Whilst it is likely that she has suffered the economic differential 
within the labour market of being both a woman, once-a-wife and a mother – she is not a 
figure who, within this particular relationship, has overtly suffered the major factors which 
cause economic vulnerability from within the relationship itself.  
 
Property (and Children) 
 
It is interesting the number of cases recorded in court decisions on property disputes which 
involve women accessing property rights through ‘the right to buy’ but requiring the input 
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of capital or income from another source in order to be able to exercise that right. By 
combining these factors, women in social housing have been able to become home-owners 
and a number of men have been able to share in the market profits released by privatisation. 
I am not aware of any academic work undertaken on this, but I am aware, anecdotally, of 
women in this position needing to seek financial help from partners or relatives in order to 
access this resource and of it (often) being seen as a ‘family’ investment in which the 
details of benefit are blurred between discussions of the home as a place in which to live, a 
resource which could be sold and the monies used to get ‘into better housing’ and as an 
inheritance for the children. These discussions rarely get anywhere near legal advice – 
partly because the house must be bought in the woman’s name anyway. 
 In the familial situation (particularly in a class setting in which members of the 
family are not used to taking legal advice or thinking in legal terms) these arrangements are 
not only informal but also, in my experience, often inchoate (in the sense that such 
discussions or agreements are seen as something which can be postponed, the important 
thing is to access the resource). This, I think, is also true of many sexual partnerships: but 
the crucial element in these is the extent to which one party might bring a more 
‘commercial’ (and individualistic) perspective to the purchase.  
 In the case of Mrs. Oxley, it is clear that they both thought it was a good idea to 
benefit from such a purchase: Mr. Hiscock seeing it as a good investment and Mrs. Oxley 
as the only way in which she could access it. But if Mr. Hiscock viewed the purchase in 
commercial terms, to what extent did Mrs. Oxley view the same purchase from a much 
more familial perspective? 
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 Research undertaken by Jan Pahl (2000a, 2000b)
27
 suggests that couples, including 
married couples, are increasingly keeping their financial resources as separate ‘pockets’ of 
money in recognition that the life cycle of relationships is such that they are likely to move 
through them, rather than remain in one. However, her work does not take into account the 
issue of house purchase. It is evident that, with the rise in property prices, few individuals 
can now afford to purchase property on their own. Accessing the property market therefore 
requires, for the majority of couples, some form of pooling: the question is how they view 
that aspect of pooling. Each might, as Mrs. Oxley and Mr. Hiscock did, bring capital into 
the purchasing of property of differential amounts and will also have to decide how to 
finance a mortgage from their earnings. Women may well, not only because of domestic 
obligations but also because of labour market inequalities, be earning a lower income than 
male partners. If we extended the implications of Jan Pahl’s research, the critical question 
is the extent to which parties have addressed their minds to the respective proportions they 
would each hold in property they have jointly, but possibly disproportionately, acquired. It 
is here that the figure of Mrs. Oxley represents an interesting issue. It is not a question of 
economic vulnerability arising from the relationship (as in the case of Mrs. Burns) but 
rather her presumption that the proportions held in the property would be equal. Was she 
bringing to her understanding of ‘how’ the property was to be shared, a presumption that 
married couples would share equally and that, as they had discussed marriage and as they 
had also discussed sharing legal title, it would follow that the property would be jointly 
held?
28
 Was she, essentially, presuming a familial model of ownership, that is of equal 
                                                 
27
 Jan Pahl’s work is primarily focused on gendered differences in expenditure, but she has also found this 
distinctive shift away from the pooling of resources. Many thanks to Jan Pahl for having discussions with 
Simone Wong and myself on this research. 
28
 I am not using ‘jointly’ here to suggest a joint tenancy as opposed to a tenancy in common. 
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sharing because they were in a cohabiting relationship which could have been a marriage? I 
will return to this point later. 
 Conversely, I would suggest that there are an increasing number of women who, 
having achieved some financial resources before their current cohabitation, often want to 
protect those resources not only for themselves but even more so, for children from a 
previous relationship. A resource that divorced women may bring into a later relationship is 
the matrimonial home, especially if they had children in the marital relationship. In these 
circumstances, again anecdotally but I think it links in with Jan Pahl’s evidence, women are 
often concerned, as are their children if old enough, to ‘protect’ their children’s inheritance. 
These women, in my experience, will often cohabit and choose not to marry, expressing 
such a choice as based on their need to protect their only capital asset.  
 I suggest that the financial position women are in at the beginning of a new 
relationship is crucial in determining their attitude towards the sharing of property, as well 
as the decision to marry, or not, when it is available to them. The factors of age, most 
especially when they have already been in a long-term relationship, and whether they have 
children, are still of child bearing years or have that behind them, are also critical.  
 We need, then, to distinguish between the different circumstances in which women 
enter into cohabitation and not only deal with the paradigm figure of the younger woman 
who is made economically vulnerable by factors arising from within the relationship itself. 
What Mrs. Oxley represents is a woman whose vulnerability arises from the fact that she 
believed that the resources within the relationship would be pooled (which also means that 
she had an expectation that she would in part benefit from sharing the wealth of Mr. 
Hiscock). Mrs. Oxley, standing in strong contrast to Mrs. Burns, is not a figure who enters 
into a relationship with no economic resources or who becomes economically vulnerable 
because of childbirth and childcare within that relationship, but rather is to be thought of as 
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a woman who made a presumption about the sharing of assets which was not shared by her 
partner. 
 Drawing from the issues raised by the case of Mrs. Oxley, I think that three factors 
suggest that the continued use of the figure of Mrs. Burns distort issues raised by 
contemporary cohabitation patterns. The first is that the figure of Mrs. Burns is used to 
present a pattern linking cohabitation, motherhood and economic vulnerability in a way 
which suggests that not only is this figure the reason for extending family law (the person 
most in need of protection) but also, by implication, that the figure is representative of 
female cohabitants. The need for intervention is then self-evident: but what this ignores is 
both the complexity of the contemporary and emerging patterns of cohabitation and the 
more complex issues raised in asking why such women as Mrs. Oxley should be able to 
appeal to family law for protection, especially when (as in her case) they have not used the 
protections available to them in property law which have been drawn to their attention. 
Secondly, to argue the need for intervention based on the figure of Mrs. Burns is to ignore 
(or at least not deal with) the cases of women who are not the economically vulnerable 
parties and who, having achieved some capital, are now concerned to protect it. Finally, 
and very pragmatically, the circumstances of the property market now make it much less 
likely that many couples can afford to buy property without some form of joint financial 
investment so that the figure of the non-contributing Mrs. Burns, in this context, presents a 
rather out of date picture. However, Mrs. Oxley raises the issue of how to deal with 
circumstances which lead to property being registered in one name alone: the question then 
is whether this, of itself, requires the intervention of family law (especially when the 
protection of property law has been ignored or refused).
29
 
                                                 
29
 Of course (as argued below) this may seem harsh when placed within the context of emotional 
vulnerability. 
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Mrs. Oxley represents rather different policy issues from those raised by the figure 
of Mrs. Burns and Mrs. Oxley is only one example (only one ‘type’)
30
 of the more plural 
and complex pattern of contemporary cohabitation. Why then continue to focus on Mrs. 
Burns? The answer is obvious: Mrs. Burns exemplifies the victim who has lost everything 
through her commitment to the man who was the father of her children. She is the iconic 
figure crying out for the protection of law. Mrs. Oxley is a rather more problematic figure 
to focus on. The issue raised by Mrs. Oxley is the extent to which the law can, or should, 
focus on her presumption that the relationship gave rise to a pooling of assets. In this sense 
Mrs. Oxley does present a figure of a vulnerable woman, in that she invested her financial 
resources in her new relationship because she ‘trusted her man’. 
 
 
MRS. OXLEY: OLDER AND WISER 
 
Mrs. Oxley answered the concerned lawyer with the statement “[I] feel I know Mr. Hiscock 
well enough not to need written legal protection” (p. 707). In 2004 (and by then living with 
another partner) Claire Dyer in The Guardian (8 June 2004) reported her as saying: 
  
I really would not want anyone else to go through what I’ve gone through. Cohabiting couples should have a 
written agreement expressing their interests in the house. Otherwise one half can lose everything.  
                                                 
30
 Consider also, for instance, the figure of the career woman with an older (and wealthier) lover in Cox v. 
Jones [2004] 3 F.C.R. 693. My point here is that there are many different ‘types’ of cohabitants and that in 
looking more closely at them, different social policy issues are raised. Taking the figure of Mrs. Oxley raises 
one set of issues, which are explored here, but using her as one example should also be read as exemplifying 
the plural nature of cohabitation – it is not only her ‘type’ which challenges the figure of Mrs. Burns, she is 
but one example of the many very different figures which are covered by the term ‘cohabitant’. 
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Mrs. Oxley, returns us to the issue of vulnerability, but emotional rather than 
economic vulnerability and perhaps, particularly, the emotional vulnerability of 
women made single in later life through divorce or separation. 
  When I considered familial patterns in relation to acquiring property through the 
right to buy, I did not, at that point, go on to suggest that, within this setting, women may 
be subject to a complex pattern of emotional (as well as economic) pressures. Anne Barlow 
has made the point, very succinctly, that the role of family law is to act in the sphere in 
which emotional ties are the fulcrum for actions, or lack of them, and decision-making, or 
lack of it.
31
 Familial patterns although often riven with power do however tend to subsist, 
sexual partnerships are more vulnerable. It is possible, given the facts as we have them, that 
Mr. Hiscock sold his own home to move in with Mrs. Oxley primarily because, in so doing, 
he released the capital which made the purchase of her home possible and he saw it as a 
good capital investment. It is equally possible that Mrs. Oxley wanted him to move in 
anyway and was glad that there was now a good reason to do so. How are we to unravel the 
extent to which either party saw it as a means to a particular end? They certainly moved on 
to live together in another home – but am I alone in thinking that it is likely that Mrs. Oxley 
invested much more emotionally in this relationship than he did? The evidence, I would 
suggest, is found in such factors as when, if we are to believe Mrs. Oxley, having promised 
to marry her he then used his ‘taxation’ argument as a reason not to do so. 
I think that here we have the crux of two related issues: emotional vulnerability and 
the promise of marriage. Emotional vulnerability and how this plays out in terms of what is 
                                                 
31
 This argument is a general theme in family law literature, but I cite Anne Barlow here because of the 
particular elegance and power she gave to this argument in a presentation addressing the issues at an E.S.R.C. 
seminar held at Leeds in June 2005. 
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spoken and when, and what remains silent, is something I have written about before 
(Bottomley 1994). I argued then that women and men deploy language, conversations and 
silences differently – and that this leaves women crucially disadvantaged in an area of law 
which requires express discussions on express issues. Women who do not entirely trust the 
commitment of their man, often allow themselves to retreat from confronting crucial issues 
because they fear the loss (I mean this term very broadly) of that man if he is provoked by 
such a confrontation. As one judge said in a previous case: “she knew her man well 
enough” not to press him.
32
 Women will too often hope for the best, hope that he sees 
things the way they do or that he will come round over time. I think that it is very likely 
that Mrs. Oxley, having invested emotionally in the relationship, would be unwilling to 
face difficult facts. She wanted to trust him and, in the end, he abused this trust: not 
necessarily by consciously tricking her (although there is some suggestion that he probably 
did) but by, in his own mind, quite clearly keeping his own understanding of his separate 
economic interests.  
 It is clear that she thought of the property as ‘jointly owned’, even the first house. 
The evidence is there in the reported facts, and fits the profile of a woman who hoped that 
their relationship was one of a joint venture, a pooling of assets, and that therefore holding 
property in one name or another was simply a question of convenience. Conversely, Mr. 
Hiscock, from the beginning, made sure that his economic investment was secure. He was 
clear about his investment, and he also seems to have been very controlling: he gave her a 
reason for not marrying and he gave her a reason for putting the second house in his name. 
I think I would not be alone in thinking, also, that his hand was behind the letter written to 
the solicitor rejecting the suggestion that her share in the property be protected:  “I feel … I 
                                                 
32
 Per Waite J., Hammond v. Mitchell [1991] 1 W.L.R. 1127, at p.1132, in relation to a promise to marry. See 
Bottomley (1998). 
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know Mr. Hiscock well enough not to need … legal protection”. “Feel” certainly, “know 
well enough”, in what sense I wonder? Mrs. Oxley, through her brave and foolish gesture 
of not formalising her affairs, displayed her emotional vulnerability and her susceptibility 
to his controlling behaviour. Emotional vulnerability is linked, here, to the question of 
marriage. Mrs. Oxley saw, I think, the promise of marriage as exemplifying her 
understanding of their commitment to each other and it was this which led her to risk 
trusting him and to presume that everything they each ‘owned’ was, in practice, joint 
assets. In other words, she was using the promise of marriage to signal a form of 
partnership which she understood to be one of merger and commitment – despite the fact 
that they did not actually marry because he found a reason not to. Here marriage is being 
used as a sign of commitment to a particular type of partnership.  
 Are women like Mrs. Oxley, who are or ‘feel’ married, more likely to allow 
themselves to become economically vulnerable (that is not to protect their separate 
interests) than those who are not married or do not think of themselves as married? If this is 
the case, then Mrs. Oxley’s evidence is even more interesting: the suggestion being that she 
only allowed this to happen because she thought of herself as part of a ‘marriage-like 
relationship’. Despite Jan Pahl’s evidence that fewer couples, whether married or not, now 
pool their resources, it might well be that older women (that is women of an older 
generation) still regard such pooling as the mark and product of commitment. Further, as 
Mr. Hiscock clearly had greater financial resources, Mrs. Oxley may well have thought that 
‘commitment’ would give her access to economic resources she would not have had if she 
had remained single. She may have made herself vulnerable, but she may have calculated 
that it was worth it if she continued to benefit economically from the relationship. 
 There are three questions to be asked here. Did Mrs. Oxley allow herself to presume 
a pooling of assets because she thought of herself as a kind-of-married woman who 
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therefore could, or should, be able to trust her man? Was this why she did not confront Mr. 
Hiscock, or protect her own financial position? Is she (along with Mrs. Burns) someone we 
believe needs the protection of family law? 
 Interestingly, given the data collected by Barlow et al. (2005) that many women 
believe that they will be treated in law as ‘common law wives’, there is no evidence given 
in the case that Mrs. Oxley thought in quite these terms. However, she is reported as 
saying, after the case, that: 
 
People have a misapprehension that after x number of months or a number of years you are a common-law 
wife. It doesn’t exist. The law doesn’t recognise that. But as much as a married person, you are putting in a 
huge investment for the future and it can be wiped out. People cohabiting should have something in writing 
(Claire Dyer, The Guardian, 8 June 2004).  
 
This may be construed as suggesting that she did think that she might have such rights and 
that she was only disabused when having to take the action she did. However, the muddle 
surrounding the idea of ‘common law marriage’ is reflected in the way in which her case 
was reported in the popular press. The Daily Mail (25 May 2004), drawing on an interview 
with Mrs. Oxley, with pictures, used the headline: “My victory for the common-law wives 
left with nothing”. The Dartford Times (27 May 2004) also used the term in its headline: 
“Common-law wife sets legal history over house”. Both could be read as trying to establish 
that ‘common law wives’ have no particular status in law, but equally, at the same time, the 
deployment of the term in such headlines keeps it in common currency, as if it does have 
some kind of meaning, if only to indicate a cohabiting relationship. Even The Guardian (8 
June 2004) covered the case from the same angle, if more explicitly making the legal point: 
“Many people believe that living with a partner for several years entitles them to the same 
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rights as marriage. But as Claire Dyer reports, there is no such thing as a ‘common-law 
wife’”. (True to form, Claire Dyer used the case of Mrs. Burns to exemplify the legal 
vulnerability of cohabiting women.) 
 The data collected by Barlow and Duncan (2000a, 2000b) suggests that women 
such as Mrs. Oxley might well think that they would, in some sense, be recognised and 
protected in law as ‘common-law wives’ and hence their argument that not to bring the law 
into line with this belief would be to bring the law into disrepute (Barlow et al. 2005). It 
seems obvious to lawyers that the protection offered is access to the divorce courts and 
property redistribution orders. I wonder, however, if there is not a more fundamental 
problem here. In my experience, many married women think that the fact of marriage gives 
them equal rights to property. For many, this is confirmed through a muddle in their minds 
between marriage status and the process many of them have experienced of buying 
property in joint names (especially when not only legal title but also the equitable interest is 
held as joint tenants).
33
 It is difficult to explain to some married women that the fact of 
marriage has not been the determining (legal) factor in whether property is jointly owned or 
not. By extension, I suggest that women like Mrs. Oxley, if they think of themselves as 
‘common law wives’, might not be thinking about access to the divorce courts, but rather 
sharing the common misapprehension of many married women that they will have a right 
to joint ownership of property.
34
 One of the elements of the realism argument, for which I 
have a great deal of sympathy, is that too many cohabitants do not make informed legal 
choices and that they therefore require the protection of family law. My concern is that in 
                                                 
33
 See also Mr. Hammond in Hammond v. Mitchell (Bottomley 1998). 
34
 The case of Mrs. Cooke (Midland Bank v. Cooke) is instructive here: she took steps to have legal title to the 
home transferred from the single name of her husband into their joint names, only to find out later that this 
was not sufficient to deal with the sharing of the beneficial interest (Bottomley 1998).  
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relation to purchasing the family home, people in general, including the married, are 
muddled about the law. In this context, allowing access to the divorce courts for property 
redistribution is not the answer. What is worrying is the possibility that any extension of 
family law in these circumstances might well lead such women as Mrs. Oxley to take even 
fewer steps to protect their position. As with many of their married sisters, simple steps 
taken in property law could well have provided them with the legal form (joint ownership) 
which they wanted: presuming, of course, that their partners were agreeable.
35
 
 In Oxley the lawyer, following professional guidelines, properly advised protection 
for the party not holding legal title. However, and given that we do not know the full 
discussions, what is worrying is that the range of options offered covered very different 
scenarios: was the money placed in either property a contribution or a loan? Did the parties 
understand the difference? Mrs. Oxley seems to have thought of the monies on all 
occasions as contributions (a more familial model), it suited Mr. Hiscock to argue that they 
were loans (a more commercial model). These sharp distinctions in law might feed into 
differences in people’s minds facilitated by the simple fact that both of them, for different 
reasons, did not overtly address what they were actually doing until things went wrong. 
The factor of marriage per se would not have made a difference, in law, to this scenario. It 
might have made a difference in the ways in which the lawyer advised them, especially in 
relation to the second property. But if Mr. Hiscock had remained, even if married, 
concerned to protect his own interests, then he would still have had the legal capacity to 
                                                 
35
 It should be remembered that many cases involve actions in relation to third parties rather than between the 
partners (as in Midland Bank v. Cooke) and that the issue of protection of property interests and claims to 
priority are crucial in these cases. 
Kent Academic Repository – Kent Law School 
Published version available in Feminist Legal Studies 14(2) 181-211 
- 27 - 
 
 




 What would giving women such as Mrs. Oxley access to the divorce courts and 
property orders do for her?  At best, it would give her a chance to bring into account her 
presumption that the assets were jointly owned, evidence that she had lost her expectation 
of a comfortable lifestyle in the future and, possibly, a concern with her ‘future needs’. But 




THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF OXLEY v. HISCOCK 
 
Early press coverage generally reported a victory for Mrs. Oxley, which in a sense it was in 
that the Court of Appeal did not agree with the argument, put for Mr. Hiscock, that the 
division of the assets should be based on direct financial contributions. Others viewed the 
case more negatively, in that the court did not support the judge at first instance and uphold 
the award of 50%, but reduced it to 40%. Unpacking the legal implications of the judgment 
requires placing the decision within the context of the development of the law in this area. 
                                                 
36
 This would, of course, be radically changed if a move was made to push for the introduction of community 
of property in this country: such a possibility is beginning to emerge in Anne Barlow’s work (Barlow 2003), 
and see her current research, “Community of Property: A Regime for England and Wales?” being undertaken 
with Elizabeth Smith (funded by Nuffield Foundation).  
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 Two aspects to the present law need to be distinguished: the first is finding the 
existence of a beneficial interest and the second is the process by which the proportion of 
that interest is determined.  
 Finding a beneficial interest has, since Lloyds Bank plc v. Rosset [1991] 1 A.C. 107, 
been focused on whether or not the parties discussed sharing the interest (‘common 
intention’) and, as a consequence of these discussions, the claimant acted to her detriment. 
In the absence of such express discussions, the courts accept direct financial contributions 
to the purchase of the property as evidence of an implied agreement. This focus on 
intention evidenced through express discussions or direct financial contributions, has been 
the object of sustained criticism by commentators who have argued that the first is too 
unlikely in most domestic relationships and the second too unfair to economically 
disadvantaged women (see e.g. Bottomley 1998; Wong 1998). However, later cases have 
somewhat mitigated these concerns by proving to be more flexible in their approach to 
finding common intention (Bottomley 2001).  
 In relation to the quantification of the beneficial interest, the primary difficulty has 
been that even when there is evidence of a common intention to share, there is often no 
direct evidence of an agreement as to proportions. In the years after Rosset, a line of cases 
developed which, under the fiction of finding a ‘common intention’ as to proportions,
37
 
displayed a willingness to look at all the relevant factors, even when dealing with cases in 
which the finding of the beneficial interest was based on direct financial contributions. In 
Midland Bank v. Cooke [1995] 4 All E.R. 562, this included the length of the relationship, 
that they had shown commitment to the relationship by marrying, that the parties’ conduct 
evidenced a sharing of both economic resources and risks, and that childcare had prevented 
                                                 
37
 That is to say, what the courts thought the parties would have (should have?) agreed if they had addressed 
the question. 
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the woman from substantially contributing to the purchase of the home. The flexible use of 
‘relevant factors’ in pursuing ‘common intention’, in particular in cases founded on direct 
financial contributions, gave rise to concerns from critics who argued that the law was 
becoming too discretionary and operating a form of re-distribution behind the fiction of 
finding ‘common intention’ (see e.g. O’Hagan 1997). These commentators argued for a 
return to a sharp distinction between cases in which the beneficial interest arose from 
express discussions and those cases based on direct financial contributions, which, they 
argued should be limited to awarding the financial proportion invested in the property (in 
other words a return to treating them as resulting trusts). This distinction lay behind the 
case put for Mr. Hiscock, in which it was argued that, as evidence of the beneficial interest 
had been based on the financial contributions made by Mrs. Oxley, the court should only 
award her the proportion of money she had contributed. They used in support of this 
argument the Court of Appeal decision in Springette v. Defoe [1992] 2 F.L.R. 388, which 
predates the 1995 decision of Midland Bank v. Cooke. The court rejected this argument but, 
in so doing, did not return to the line of reasoning established in Cooke. The preference of 
the Court of Appeal was to approach a decision as to proportions not on ‘the fiction of 
common intention’ but rather on the basis of ‘fairness’ and, in so doing, they adopted 
‘estoppel’ principles as the correct approach for the courts to take. 
In taking this position, the court emphasised the extent to which the jurisprudence 
of ‘common intention constructive trust’ cases has become closely tied to that of estoppel. 
Estoppel, must be understood as two distinctive phases. The first establishes the case for 
legal intervention (that there has been a representation made to the claimant, in reliance 
upon which the claimant acted to her detriment) and the second is the process by which the 
court decides what it would be ‘fair’ to award, which is not entirely discretionary but is 
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 In the case of Oxley v. Hiscock, the judge awarded 40% based on the respective 
initial contributions of the parties (which would have given Mrs. Oxley c. 28%) plus the 
fact that they had pooled resources to pay for household expenses which, in the absence of 
contrary evidence, he presumed to have provided equal contributions to the mortgage 
repayments. It could certainly be argued that this still gave too much weight to finances and 
that Mrs. Oxley was lucky in that she had had monies to contribute. It could also be argued 
that the approach of the trial judge was fairer to Mrs. Oxley, in that she emphasised Mrs. 
Oxley’s belief that she was an equal owner in the property. However, none of these factors 
should be taken as suggesting, necessarily, that this shift towards estoppel signals a move 
away from being able to use the width of ‘relevant’ factors developed through Cooke and a 
return to privileging financial contributions.
39
 
 It remains to be seen whether the new approach of the Court of Appeal will prove to 
be more limiting and operate against those who lack financial resources. I do think that 
there was some concern that lower courts were acting in a too discretionary manner and 
that the Court of Appeal were concerned to return to a more ‘principled approach’. How 
the new jurisprudence develops will, however, depend in great part on not only the type of 
cases which will come before the courts, but also the extent to which the courts might begin 
to distinguish key elements in these case which could result to a more nuanced account of 
                                                 
38
 See guidance given in Yaxley v. Gotts [2000] Ch. 102, Gillett v. Holt [2001] Ch. 210 and Jennings v. Rice 
[2003] 1 P. & C. R. 100. An extensive discussion is found in Bright & McFarlane (2005). 
39
 The argument that it is more restrictive than the previous line of cases has been put orally by a number of 
feminists in workshops and seminars I have attended, which is why I addressed the issue in these terms in this 
paper. 
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‘fairness’. For instance, how might the courts begin to balance the issue of expectation as 
opposed to a focus on the extent of the detriment (Gray & Gray 2005; Bright & McFarlane 
2005; Smith 2006)? Answers to these kinds of questions will be teased out not in an 
abstract account of the jurisprudence but rather within the specific context in which the 
cases occur. But for instance: might it develop that cases which suggest a more ‘familial’ 
context will result in the courts looking more closely at expectation rather than an account 
of detriment? 
 The award in Oxley v. Hiscock should be seen as decided on a particular set of facts, 
rather than as operating as an indication of the approach that is likely to be taken in all 
cohabitation cases. For instance, the age of the parties (which resulted in ‘later’ 
cohabitation without children), the fact that they both brought some financial resources into 
the purchase of the properties and their use of a formula which spoke of ‘loans’, might be 
said to contribute to a scenario of a more ‘commercial’ rather than ‘familial’ type. Such 
scenarios might well lead to the court focusing on detriment rather than expectation.
40
 
However, the key is the principle stated by Chadwick L.J. that: 
 
…each is entitled to the share which the court thinks fair having regard to the whole course of dealings 
between them in relation to the property (p. 148). 
 
Oxley v. Hiscock is regarded by some commentators as a positive and progressive 
contribution to developing principles in this area of law whilst keeping open a flexible 
approach (see e.g. Gray & Gray 2005, p. 931) and it may be that the concern that some 
have expressed that, whilst estoppel does somewhat mitigate the rigours of the more 
                                                 
40
 See also Cox v. Jones. 
Kent Academic Repository – Kent Law School 
Published version available in Feminist Legal Studies 14(2) 181-211 
- 32 - 
 
 
conventional trusts approach it is still too limited when compared to family law (e.g. Miles 
2003), is not now so pertinent.  
 There is another aspect in which opening up trusts to estoppel may help cohabitants 
when presenting a claim and that is in the raising of the beneficial interest. Oxley v. 
Hiscock returns us to look more closely at the ways in which the jurisprudence of estoppel 
may enhance the possibilities of a more flexible reading of Rosset. Waite J. in Hammond v. 
Mitchell [1991] 1 W.L.R. 1127 gives an example of the potential in his astute use of Grant 
v. Edwards [1986] 1 Ch. 638 to bring in ‘expectation’ when dealing with finding ‘common 
intention’. Given the frequent problem of finding express discussions as required by 
Rosset, a more direct use of estoppel when seeking a beneficial interest might be helped by 
references to estoppel cases in which express discussions are not always needed. It may be 
sufficient that the party against whom the claim is being made should ‘reasonably have 
known’ that the claimant would not have acted in the way they did, but for the fact that 




                                                 
41
 Some commentators, including myself, have been concerned that an estoppel approach moves towards 
litigation based on a ‘claim’ rather than a ‘right’ and that is too open to the discretion of the court in terms of 
the award given (Bottomley 1998, 2001). It is now clear that common intention constructive trusts and 
estoppel are so jurisprudentially close that it is impossible to attempt to hold to a sharp distinction between 
the two. Further, my arguments here suggest that the jurisprudence of estoppel may well have a beneficial 
effect in mitigating the limitations of Rosset. Moreover, our concern that estoppel is remedy-based and may 
not be protected against a third party is now finally answered by s.116 of the Land Registration Act 2002 (and 
see Bright & McFarlane 2005). In my opinion, in domestic property cases, the close tie between common 
intention constructive trusts and estoppel holds the virtue of keeping the jurisprudence closely tied to the 
intentions of the parties, with a now far better ‘fallback’ position of whether an expectation was raised upon 
which the claimant acted to her detriment. 
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Would such an approach have helped Mrs. Burns? It is interesting to pose this 
question as the first domestic property case to, in part, use estoppel principles did so to try 
and avoid the limitations of the Burns v. Burns judgment, which rested entirely on the lack 
of direct financial contributions.
42
 The difficulty, however, in all domestic partnership 
cases is proving, under either an estoppel or trusts approach, that the claimant acted 
because of her belief that she had a property interest, rather than because of the relationship 
itself.
43
 However, the flexibility of estoppel remedies means that, having raised the equity, 
the court could find that it is met by a lesser interest than a beneficial interest: for instance, 
a compensation award or an occupation right. Although this does open us to the problems 
of a remedial approach (Bottomley 2001), it has the benefits of not having to remain 
focused on issues of ownership as the only fulcrum for accessing remedies which may 
protect occupation or provide some capital (Dewar 1998). Although trusts claims arise in 
relation to specific property rather than simply against the wealth of the partner, estoppel 
can operate to open this to some extent and look at wealth more generally if, for instance, 
the claimant was led to believe that she would be ‘looked after’ by the transfer of property 
to her at some point, without the actual property being specified.
44
 Further, ‘expectation’ 
can be used, in part, to address future needs by emphasising what has been lost as a result 
of the claimant acting to her detriment.  
If Mrs. Burns is, so to speak, still not satisfied by property law, she would now be 
able to seek an award in family law through an application to the court on behalf of her 
children, which could include a capital payment.
45
 Therefore, what is clear is that the 
                                                 
42
 Grant v. Edwards.  
43
 Although see the flexible attitude with which Waite J. approaches this in Hammond v. Mitchell. 
44
 Jennings v. Rice.  
45
 Family Law Reform Act 1987, s.12. 
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continual references to Mrs. Burn’s plight in the courts does not take into account 
subsequent changes in the law and does not allow us really to judge how far she is a good 
representative of what is at stake. 
 
 
REASSESSING THE CASE FOR REFORM 
 
There are, of course, other aspects to the work being carried out by the Law Commission 
beyond the issue of property adjustment after separation, the important issues of intestate 
succession and taxation among them, but it is the issue of property readjustment that has 
continually been at the forefront of the demand for reform.
46
 
 The case for realism is built on the simple fact that fewer couples are choosing to 
marry. Placed against initial government policy to encourage marriage as the more stable 
domestic unit, the problem for government is that reform may well encourage the trend 
away from marriage. Certainly, concerns with social stability will be raised if and when 
proposals are put to parliament, along with the concerns of those who wish to protect 
marriage for religious reasons. But as the case for realism has been put, and put forcefully, 
government attitudes have shifted and it is interesting to consider why. It could, of course, 
be simply that they are persuaded by the arguments. It could also be that they are concerned 
that legal challenges may be mounted on the basis of equality if no moves are made. It 
could also be that they are concerned not to be seen as having been willing to legislate for 
same-sex couples and, at the same time, not meet the demand that vulnerable women 
                                                 
46
 Many of these matters could, of course, be dealt with by amending relevant legislation to include 
cohabitants. 
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should be protected in law (especially when they believe that they already are). All these 
aspects could well have played a part in the shift in government thinking. But I would also 
suggest that there could be another factor in play: an argument that by bringing cohabitants 
into family law, a modified marriage law regime, law and social policy might be able to 
find ways of stabilising domestic units through a reinforcement of family values carried 
through the application of a marriage (like) model.
47
 What is seen by reformers as 
protection for women is, at the very same time, an extension of the regulation of domestic 
units and a pushing of such units into a model based on not only the rights but also the 
obligations and responsibilities of marriage.
48
  
 The benevolent model of extending the protections of family law to cohabitants is 
premised on an assumption that not only does property law fail women, but that family law 
does not. What this assumes is that we have to accept that marriage is a model worth 
extending to cohabitants: what we, as feminists, have to keep open is the question of 
whether the benefits of such a move outweigh the disadvantages.  
 Within this paper I have kept referring to ‘marriage’ law rather than simply ‘family’ 
law, in order to emphasise that that is what, I think, is at present being argued for (even 
given the fact that it will only be certain indices of the legal status of marriage which will 
be given to cohabitants). However, the question can be raised as to whether by continuing 
to extend ‘marriage’ (that is elements of marriage law to civil partnerships and then to all 
cohabitants) all relationships are subsumed into a marriage model or whether such 
                                                 
47
 In relation to this, see the economic modelling which addresses this social policy aim (e.g. Dnes 2004 ; 
Dnes & Rowthorn 2000, 2002). 
48
 I mean this in social policy terms rather than legal ones. 
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extensions (particularly if they move beyond sexual partners)
49
 might ‘stretch’ marriage to 
a point at which it becomes only one aspect of a law of domestic relations (Bottomley & 
Wong 2006). 
 Essentially, I think that we need to be much more careful with the terms within 
which the argument for realism has been put. How ‘realistic’ is it to continually refer to 
Mrs. Burns? How careful are we being in considering the different trends in cohabitation 
and the very much more plural circumstances within which women place or find 
themselves as cohabitants? From the best of all possible motives (protection), is the case 
for realism feeding not only a rather patronising picture of an ill informed and 
economically/emotionally vulnerable woman, but also feeding into a social policy 
imperative to draw more domestic units into patterns of familial regulation which are aimed 
not so much at protection of the individual but rather at stabilisation of the unit? Is it really 
true that too many women now suffer by not being able to access financial orders at the end 
of the relationship? To what extent does family law really offer protection for economically 
or emotionally vulnerable women in a way which property law simply cannot? Seeking 
answers to these questions should surely be rather more cautious and nuanced than the 
arguments which, to date, are being presented by those arguing the case for reform. Even 
given the fact that, initially at least, a robust campaign and critique had to be presented as a 
counterweight to the government investment in marriage, I think it would be very 
problematic, for feminists, to continue to present a case which presumes that cohabiting 
women are failed by property law and need the benefits of family law.  
What is clear is that reform which extends crucial aspects of marriage law will 
lessen our choices about how we organise our domestic lives. It has been argued by the 
                                                 
49
 In extending the law to cover cohabitants of same-sex as well as opposite-sex partners, the issue of the 
centrality of sexual relations will, necessarily, come much more into focus. 
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reformers, and it is a strong argument, that the evidence shows that too many of us do not 
make informed choices and I have argued in this paper that many of us are too often 
vulnerable when choices have to, or should, be made in relation to sexual partners. It may 
be, in this light, that bringing in reform will address these issues, especially if it includes 
the proposal that couples should be able to ‘opt-out’ of the regime.
50
 But I then return to 
my argument that, on the specific issue of property ownership, reform can do no more than 
allow for property redistribution and that, at best, it is only specific categories of 
economically vulnerable women (probably with children) who can benefit from this. In 
relation to these cases, I agree with the critics of property law that ‘future needs’ can only 
be adequately and directly addressed within a family law approach (Miles 2003), but it 
could be argued that most of these cases could be covered by an extension of the remedies 
available via claims made on behalf of children. From a feminist perspective: is there really 
any other group of cohabiting women who we think would and should benefit from access 
to the family law courts? Further, whilst I have never thought that property law can or 
should be a vehicle for property redistribution, I do not believe that it continues to be as 
harsh a regime as the critics suggest. And finally, I am concerned that the case for realism 
addresses ‘difficult’ cases and the proportion of people who believe that ‘common law 
marriage’ has a status in law, without giving adequate consideration to a rather more 
general but more progressive point: if nearly 40% of people know that ‘common law 
                                                 
50
 See Wong (2006) in this issue. It is interesting to place the issue of opt-out within the context of, first, the 
1998 Green Paper (supra, n. 13) interest in using pre-nuptial contracts to help focus the parties minds on 
property arrangements and, second, the Nuffield research project (supra, n. 36) being undertaken by Anne 
Barlow and Elizabeth Smith on the issue of introducing community of property in the U.K. for married 
couples. If the introduction of community of property were to be recommended, then: (a) would it extend to 
cohabitants; and (b) would cohabitants and married couples be allowed to opt-out of the regime by the use of 
such agreements?  
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marriage’ is a fiction, do these people represent a group that also know, even if in a 
muddled way, that they have to, or should, take steps to protect the economic aspect of 
their domestic lives and should they not be encouraged to take those steps? By bringing in 
a marriage-like regime, we could simply reinforce the idea that nothing needs to be done 
because the courts will sort it out if it goes wrong. 
 Is there, then, a feminist position which may take an alternative approach to the 
demand that family law be extended to cohabitants? It is interesting that one paper on the 
government website dealing with marriage and divorce does so from the perspective that 
‘individualism’ fails ‘the family’.
51
 In a sense, but coming from a very different political 
position, this concern also permeates feminist approaches to the family and family law. On 
the one hand, we seek policies that support our own independence and, on the other hand, 
we seek policies which recognise and support interdependency, especially when such 
interdependency has left women economically vulnerable. It is, in an unfortunately messy 
way, a situation in which we have to try and find the best balance we can in difficult 
circumstances. I do not, therefore, have a simple answer to whether women (still) need 
marriage law: what I am, however, convinced about is that the question needs asking and 
that we should approach the issue of reform with caution. At its worst it could become, 
ironically given the claim for realism used by the reformers, a symbolic reform which will 
answer, in reality, only a narrow range of issues for a small proportion of women, whilst, at 
the same time, serving to reinforce the continuing centrality of the ideal of marriage and 




                                                 
51
 Supra, n. 14. 
52
 In relation to this I believe that we should take the warnings of Donzelot (1997) seriously. 
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